So I need to compile a list of ALL assets, information or otherwise,
That leads to tables and chairs and powerbars.
OK so you can't work without those, but that's not what I meant.
Physical assets are only relevant in so far as they part of information processing. You should not start from those, you should start from the information and look at how the business processes make use of it. Don't confuse you DR/BC plan with your core ISMS statements. ISO Standard 22301 addresses that.
This is, ultimately, about the business processes.
On the ISO2700 forum one user gave a long description of his information gathering process but expressed frustration over what to do with it all all, the assets, the threats and so forth, and trying to make it into a risk assessment.
It was easy for the more experienced of us to see what he was missing.
He was missing something very important -- a RISK MODEL
The model determines what you look for and how it is relevant.
The hack to make the HP printers burn was interesting, but lets face it, a printer today is a special purpose computer and a computer almost always has a flaw which can be exploited.
In his book on UI design "The Inmates are Running the Asylum", Alan Cooper makes the point that just about everything these days, cameras, cars, phones, hearing aids, pacemakers, aircraft, traffic lights ... have computers running them and so what we interface with is the computer not the natural mechanics of the device any more.
Applying this observation makes this a very scary world. More like Skynet in the Terminator movies now that cars have Navi*Star and that in some countries the SmartStreets traffic systems have the traffic lights telling each other about their traffic flow. Cameras already have wifi so they can upload to the 'Net-of-a-Thousand-Lies.
Some printers have many more functions; some being fax, repro, and scanning as well as printing a document. And look at firewalls. Look at all the additional functions being
poured into them because of the "excess computing facility" - DNS, Squid-like caching, authentication ...
I recently bought a LinkSys for VoIP, and got the simplest one I could find. I saw models that were also wifi routers, printer servers and more all bundled onto the "gateway" with the "firewall" function. And the firewall was a lot less capable than in my old SMC Barricade-9 home router.
I'm dreading what the home market will have come IP6
I recall the Chinese curse: yes we live in "interesting security issue" times!
But in the long run of things the HP Printer Hack isn't that serious. After all, how many printers are exposed to the Internet. We have to ask "how likely is that?".
Too many places (and people) put undue emphasis on Risk Analysis and ask "show me the numbers" questions. As if everyone who has been hacked (a) even knows abut it and (b) is willing to admit to the details.
No, I agree with Donn Parker; there are many things we can do that are in the realm of "common sense" once you get to stop and think about it. Many protective controls are "umbrellas", that its about how you configure your already paid-for-and-installed (you did install it, didn't you, its not sitting in the box in the wiring closet) firewall; by spending the money you would have spent anyway for the model that has better control/protection -- you do this with your car: air-bags, ABS and so on so why not with IT equipment? The "Baseline" is more often about proper decisions and proper configuration than "throwing money at it" the way governments and government agencies do.
What framework would you use to provide for quantitative or qualitative risk analysis at both the micro and macro level? I'm asking about a true risk assessment framework not merely a checklist.
Yes, this is a bit of a META-Question. But then its Sunday, a day for contemplation.
When does something like these stop being a check-list and become a framework?
COBIT is very clearly a framework, but not for risk analysis and even the section on risk analysis fits in to a business model rather than a technology model.
ISO-27K is arguably more technology (or at least InfoSec) focused that COBIT, but again risk analysis is only part of what its about. ISO-27K calls itself a standard but in reality its a framework.
The message that these two frameworks send about risk analysis is
Context is Everything
(You expected me to say that, didn't you?)
I'm not sure any RA method works at layer 8 or above. We all know that managers can read our reports and recommendations and ignore them. Or perhaps not read them, since being aware of the risk makes them liable.
Ah. Good point.
On LinkedIn there was a thread asking why banks seem to ignore risk analysis .. presumably because their doing so has brought us to the international financial crisis we're in (though I don't think its that simple).
The trouble is that RA is a bit of a 'hypothetical' exercise.
Like many forms of presenting facts, not least of all about risk, reducing complex and multifaceted information to a single figure does a dis-service to those affected. The classical risk equation is another example of this; summing, summing many hundreds of fluctuating variables to one figure.
Perhaps the saddest expression of this kind of approach to numerology is the stock market. We accept that the bulk of the economy is based on small companies but the stock exchanges have their "Top 100" or "Top 50" which are all large companies. Perhaps they do have an effect on the economy the same way that herd of elephants might, but the biomass of this planet is mostly made up, like our economy, of small things.
The financial loss of internet fraud is non-trivial but not exactly bleeding us to death. Life goes on anyway and we work around it. But it adds up. Extrapolated over a couple of hundred years it would have the same financial value as a World Killer Asteroid Impact that wiped out all of human civilization. (And most of human life.)
A ridiculously dramatic example, yes, but this kind of reduction to a one-dimensional scale such as "dollar value" leads to such absurdities. Judges in court cases often put dollar values on human life. What value would you put on your child's ?
We know, based on past statistics, the probability that a US president will be assassinated. (Four in 200+ years; more if you allow for failed attempts). With that probability we can calculate the ALE and hence what the presidential guard cost should be capped at.
A colleague in InfoSec made the following observation:
My point - RA is a nice to have, but it is superfluous. It looks nice
but does NOTHING without the bases being covered. what we need
is a baseline that everyone accepts as necessary (call it the house
odds if you like...)
Most of us in the profession have met the case where a Risk Analysis would be nice to have but is superfluous because the baseline controls that were needed were obvious and 'generally accepted', which makes me wonder why any of us support the fallacy or RA.
It gets back to the thing about the Hollywood effect that is Pen Testing. Quite apart from the many downsides it has from a business POV it is non-logical in the same way that RA is non-logical.
One list I subscribe I saw this outrageous statement:
ISO 27001 requires that you take account of all the relevant threats
(and vulnerabilities) to every asset - that means that you have to
consider whether every threat from your list is related to each of
I certainly hope not!
Unless you have a rule as to where to stop those lists - vectors that you are going to multiply - are going to become indefinitely large if not infinite. Its a problem in set theory to do with enumberability.
for a more complete discussion of this aspect of 'risk'.
in which Jeff Lowder has a discussion of the "utility value" approach to controls
Because its the controls and their effectiveness that really count.
A business might possibly choose not to have a BCP but they might be interested in doing a BIA
After all, the "impact" might be something positive resulting from some change.
Oh, the Irony!
Expeditious and cost effective.
I've audited BCPs and always found them lacking. They are difficult to build and often make assumptions that are necessary to get the plan done but are unreasonable in reality.
What we had drilled into us when I worked in Internal Audit and when I was preparing for the CISA exam was the following
RISK is the
PROBABILITY that a
THREAT will exploit a
VULNERABILITY to cause harm to an
R = f(T, V, A)
Why do you think they are called "TVAs"?
More sensibly the risk is the sum over all the various ..
This isn't just me sounding off. Richard Bejtlich says much the same thing and defends it from various sources. I can't do better that he has.
There are numerous assumptions and estimations in the risk
assessment process, so all calculated values have quite wide margins
of error. Worse still, there are almost certainly risks or impacts
that we have failed to recognise or assess, in other words we need to
allow for contingency.
Oh,its worse than that!
The problem is that the potential perpetrators are the ones that determine "the most significant risks" of which you speak, in both frequency (when they decide to strike) and impact (how much damage they will do and what they will do with the results of their attacks), not the person performing the risk analysis.
We are debating how to value an asset, book value, replacement value or the value of the process of using it. Well that doesn't matter; its the value to the perpetrator of the attack at counts. What you value and defend might be of no interest to him (or her). Obtaining the desired asset may result in collateral damage.
So long as you focus on a Risk Analysis model rather than a comprehensive plan of diligence and security stablemen you are going to get caught out by these false assumptions.
Face it: the Risk Analysis approach means you have no idea who and where the potential perpetrators are, rational or irrational; when and how they may strike (with a tank, an army, or with false data entry).
But act and calculate as if you do.
You have no idea of the perpetrator's
but the Risk Analysis approach presumes that you do.
I'm sorry, this doesn't make sense and hence arguing about how to calculate the value of an asset doesn't make sense in this context. Its like arguing over how many angels can dance on a pinhead when there's war and famine going on outside.
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