Viagra for woman On the ISO27000 Forum list, viagra for woman someone asked:
Viagra for woman That's a very ingenious way of looking at it!
Viagra for woman One way of formulating the risk statement is from the control
objective mentioned in the standard.
Is there any other way out ?
Viagra for woman Ingenious aside, viagra for woman I'd be very careful with an approach like this.
Viagra for woman Risks and controlsare not, viagra for woman should not, viagra for woman be 1:1.
Viagra history The hack to make the HP printers burn was interesting, viagra history but lets face it, viagra history a printer today is a special purpose computer and a computer almost always has a flaw which can be exploited.
In his book on UI design "The Inmates are Running the Asylum", viagra history Alan Cooper makes the point that just about everything these days, viagra history cameras, viagra history cars, viagra history phones, viagra history hearing aids, viagra history pacemakers, viagra history aircraft, viagra history traffic lights ... Viagra history have computers running them and so what we interface with is the computer not the natural mechanics of the device any more.
Viagra history Applying this observation makes this a very scary world. Viagra history More like Skynet in the Terminator movies now that cars have Navi*Star and that in some countries the SmartStreets traffic systems have the traffic lights telling each other about their traffic flow. Viagra history Cameras already have wifi so they can upload to the 'Net-of-a-Thousand-Lies.
Viagra history Some printers have many more functions; some being fax, viagra history repro, viagra history and scanning as well as printing a document. And look at firewalls. Viagra history Look at all the additional functions being
poured into them because of the "excess computing facility" - DNS, viagra history Squid-like caching, viagra history authentication ...
Viagra history I recently bought a LinkSys for VoIP, viagra history and got the simplest one I could find. Viagra history I saw models that were also wifi routers, viagra history printer servers and more all bundled onto the "gateway" with the "firewall" function. Viagra history And the firewall was a lot less capable than in my old SMC Barricade-9 home router.
Viagra history I'm dreading what the home market will have come IP6
Viagra history I recall the Chinese curse: yes we live in "interesting security issue" times!
Viagra history But in the long run of things the HP Printer Hack isn't that serious. After all, viagra history how many printers are exposed to the Internet. We have to ask "how likely is that?".
Too many places (and people) put undue emphasis on Risk Analysis and ask "show me the numbers" questions. Viagra history As if everyone who has been hacked (a) even knows abut it and (b) is willing to admit to the details.
Viagra history No, viagra history I agree with Donn Parker; there are many things we can do that are in the realm of "common sense" once you get to stop and think about it. Viagra history Many protective controls are "umbrellas", viagra history that its about how you configure your already paid-for-and-installed (you did install it, viagra history didn't you, viagra history its not sitting in the box in the wiring closet) firewall; by spending the money you would have spent anyway for the model that has better control/protection -- you do this with your car: air-bags, viagra history ABS and so on so why not with IT equipment? The "Baseline" is more often about proper decisions and proper configuration than "throwing money at it" the way governments and government agencies do.
Cheap robert.up2.co.il viagra Soe people ae under the mistaken impression that a Pen Test simulates a hacker's action. We get ridiculous statements in RFPs such as:
Cheap robert.up2.co.il viagra The tests shall be conducted in a broader way like a hacker will do.
Cheap robert.up2.co.il viagra LOL! If a real hacker is doing it then its not a test 🙂
Cheap robert.up2.co.il viagra Seriously: what a hacker does might involve a lot more, cheap robert.up2.co.il viagra a lot more background research, cheap robert.up2.co.il viagra some social engineering and other things. Cheap robert.up2.co.il viagra It might involve "borrowing" the laptop or smartphone from one of your salesmen or executives.
Cheap robert.up2.co.il viagra Further, cheap robert.up2.co.il viagra a real hacker is not going to be polite, cheap robert.up2.co.il viagra is not going to care about what collateral damage he does while penetrating your system, cheap robert.up2.co.il viagra what lives he may harm in any number of ways.
Cheap robert.up2.co.il viagra And a real hacker is not going to record the results and present them in a nicely formatted Powerpoint presentation to management along with recommendations for remediation.
Cialis and levitra A colleague in InfoSec made the following observation:
Cialis and levitra My point - RA is a nice to have, cialis and levitra but it is superfluous. Cialis and levitra It looks nice
but does NOTHING without the bases being covered. Cialis and levitra what we need
is a baseline that everyone accepts as necessary (call it the house
odds if you like...)
Cialis and levitra Most of us in the profession have met the case where a Risk Analysis would be nice to have but is superfluous because the baseline controls that were needed were obvious and 'generally accepted', cialis and levitra which makes me wonder why any of us support the fallacy or RA.
Cialis and levitra It gets back to the thing about the Hollywood effect that is Pen Testing. Cialis and levitra Quite apart from the many downsides it has from a business POV it is non-logical in the same way that RA is non-logical.
Buying viagra One list I subscribe I saw this outrageous statement:
Buying viagra ISO 27001 requires that you take account of all the relevant threats
(and vulnerabilities) to every asset - that means that you have to
consider whether every threat from your list is related to each of
Buying viagra "All"? "Every"?
I certainly hope not!
Unless you have a rule as to where to stop those lists - vectors that you are going to multiply - are going to become indefinitely large if not infinite. Buying viagra Its a problem in set theory to do with enumberability.
Buying viagra See
for a more complete discussion of this aspect of 'risk'.
Buying viagra See
in which Jeff Lowder has a discussion of the "utility value" approach to controls
Buying viagra Because its the controls and their effectiveness that really count.
Cialis woman That's a very interesting and pertinent presentation by a guy named Grubb from RedHat:
Cialis woman A few items caught my eye:
Cialis woman Slide 7 points out that the CERTs really don't do a good job, cialis woman comparatively speaking, cialis woman of detecting vulnerabilities. Cialis woman It seems that the "million eyes" of other FOSS parties, cialis woman developers, cialis woman other distributors & packagers and individuals are much more effective than companies and organizations targeted at such things.
Cialis woman Slide 15 addresses partitioning. Cialis woman I'm amazed at the number of people I hear on the *IX forums I subscribe to and web sites I read that fail to partition and protect their disks. Cialis woman Its as if they think the way Microsoft's OEM/consumer systems ship with everything under C: is the way to go with Linux as well. Cialis woman Oh, cialis woman I do see some separate
/home, cialis woman but it seems only a few of the corporate admins have noted the security bugs possible if
/tmp is on the root partition. Cialis woman The advantages of further partitioning I have found to be immense - compartmentalization prevents so many minor problems from becoming major ones. Cialis woman The designers of the Titanic should have realised.
Cialis woman There's so much more good stuff in that about specifics of configuration. Cialis woman My advice to many less security-experienced sysadmins is "just do it". Cialis woman Why? In my database of quotes I have
Cialis woman Bullet proof vest vendors do not need to demonstrate that naked
people are vulnerable to gunfire. Cialis woman Similarly, cialis woman a security
consultant does not need to demonstrate an actual vulnerability
in order to claim there is a valid risk.
The lack of a live exploit does not mean there is no risk.
- Crispin Cowan, cialis woman 23 Aug 2002
Cialis woman That *I* can't demonstrate or document an exploit is no reason for the
sysadmin to fail to apply a well known baseline control such as those documented in this slideshow and many other books and articles. Cialis woman Yes, cialis woman I know that I sound like Donn Parker when I say that, cialis woman but this is sensible prudence.
Cialis woman "Just Do It"
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