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Viagra for woman I'm looking for Risk statement for each ISO 27k control; meaning
"what is the risk of not implementing a control".

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Viagra for woman One way of formulating the risk statement is from the control
objective mentioned in the standard.
Is there any other way out ?

Viagra for woman Ingenious aside, viagra for woman I'd be very careful with an approach like this.

Viagra for woman Risks and controlsare not, viagra for woman should not, viagra for woman be 1:1.

Viagra History

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Viagra history The hack to make the HP printers burn was interesting, viagra history but lets face it, viagra history a printer today is a  special purpose computer and a computer almost always has a flaw which can be exploited.
In his book on UI design "The Inmates are Running the Asylum", viagra history Alan Cooper makes the point that just about everything these days, viagra history cameras, viagra history cars, viagra history phones, viagra history hearing aids, viagra history pacemakers, viagra history aircraft, viagra history traffic lights ... Viagra history have computers  running them and so what we interface with is the computer not the natural mechanics of the device any more.

Viagra history Applying this observation makes this a very scary world. Viagra history More like Skynet in the Terminator movies now that cars have Navi*Star and that in some countries the SmartStreets traffic systems have the traffic lights telling each other about their traffic flow. Viagra history Cameras already have wifi so they can upload to the 'Net-of-a-Thousand-Lies.

Viagra history Some printers have many more functions; some being fax, viagra history repro, viagra history and scanning as well as printing a document.   And look at firewalls. Viagra history Look at all the additional functions being
poured into them because of the "excess computing facility" - DNS, viagra history Squid-like caching, viagra history authentication ...

Viagra history I recently bought a LinkSys for VoIP, viagra history and got the simplest one I could find. Viagra history I saw models that were also wifi routers, viagra history printer servers and more all bundled onto the "gateway" with the "firewall" function. Viagra history And the firewall was a lot less capable than in my old SMC Barricade-9 home router.

Viagra history I'm dreading what the home market will have come IP6

Viagra history I recall the Chinese curse: yes we live in "interesting security issue" times!

Viagra history But in the long run of things the HP Printer Hack isn't that serious.   After all, viagra history how many printers are exposed to the Internet.    We have to ask "how likely is that?".
Too many places (and people) put undue emphasis on Risk Analysis and ask "show me the numbers" questions. Viagra history As if everyone who has been hacked (a) even knows abut it and (b) is willing to admit to the details.

Viagra history No, viagra history I agree with Donn Parker; there are many things we can do that are in the realm of "common sense" once you get to stop and think about it. Viagra history Many protective controls are "umbrellas", viagra history that its about how you configure your already paid-for-and-installed (you did install it, viagra history didn't you, viagra history its not sitting in the box in the wiring closet) firewall; by spending the money you would have spent anyway for the model that has better control/protection -- you do this with your car: air-bags, viagra history ABS and so on so why not with IT equipment? The "Baseline" is more often about proper decisions and proper configuration than "throwing money at it" the way governments and government agencies do.

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Posted by Anton Aylward

Cheap viagra Soe people ae under the mistaken impression that a Pen Test simulates a hacker's action.  We get ridiculous statements in RFPs such as:

Cheap viagra The tests shall be conducted in a broader way like a hacker will do.

Cheap viagra LOL! If a real hacker is doing it then its not a test 🙂

Cheap viagra Seriously: what a hacker does might involve a lot more, cheap viagra a lot more background research, cheap viagra some social engineering and other things. Cheap viagra It might involve "borrowing" the laptop or smartphone from one of your salesmen or executives.

Cheap viagra Further, cheap viagra a real hacker is not going to be polite, cheap viagra is not going to care about what collateral damage he does while penetrating your system, cheap viagra what lives he may harm in any number of ways.

Cheap viagra And a real hacker is not going to record the results and present them in a nicely formatted Powerpoint presentation to management along with recommendations for remediation.

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Posted by Anton Aylward

Cialis daily canada We were discussing which should be done first and someone said:

Cialis daily canada The first has to be risk assessment as it is foundation of information
security. Cialis daily canada You first need to know where is the risk before putting up
any controls to mitigate that risk. Cialis daily canada Putting up adhoc controls will not
make the controls effective nor will it protect the organizations
against the risk.

Cialis daily canada While I understand the intent, cialis daily canada I think that is very prejudicial language.

Cialis daily canada Donn Parker makes a very good case that we have the cultural context - read that sophistication and awareness of the baseline risks - to see that there should be a set of baseline controls. Cialis daily canada IAM, cialis daily canada firewall, cialis daily canada AV, cialis daily canada backups and so forth. Cialis daily canada We don't need to leave the assets exposed to threats while we we wait around for a Risk Analysis to tell us that these baseline protective controls are needed.

Risk Analysis

Cialis daily canada You don't need to know the specific risks any more than you need to know the specific risks to have a lock on the front door of your house and close your windows.

Cialis daily canada I certainly wouldn't call this approach "ad-hoc".

Cialis And Levitra

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Cialis and levitra A colleague in InfoSec made the following observation:

Cialis and levitra My point - RA is a nice to have, cialis and levitra but it is superfluous. Cialis and levitra It looks nice
but does NOTHING without the bases being covered. Cialis and levitra what we need
is a baseline that everyone accepts as necessary (call it the house
odds if you like...)

Cialis and levitra Most of us in the profession have met the case where a Risk Analysis would be nice to have but is superfluous because the baseline controls that were needed were obvious and 'generally accepted', cialis and levitra which makes me wonder why any of us support the fallacy or RA.

Cialis and levitra It gets back to the thing about the Hollywood effect that is Pen Testing. Cialis and levitra Quite apart from the many downsides it has from a business POV it is non-logical in the same way that RA is non-logical.

Buying Viagra

Posted by Anton Aylward

Buying viagra One list I subscribe I saw this outrageous statement:

Buying viagra ISO 27001 requires that you take account of all the relevant threats
(and vulnerabilities) to every asset - that means that you have to
consider whether every threat from your list is related to each of
your assets.

Buying viagra "All"? "Every"?
I certainly hope not!
Unless you have a rule as to where to stop those lists - vectors that you are going to multiply - are going to become indefinitely large if not infinite. Buying viagra Its a problem in set theory to do with enumberability.

Buying viagra See
for a more complete discussion of this aspect of 'risk'.

Buying viagra See
in which Jeff Lowder has a discussion of the "utility value" approach to controls

Buying viagra Because its the controls and their effectiveness that really count.

Cialis Woman

Posted by Anton Aylward

Cialis woman That's a very interesting and pertinent presentation by a guy named Grubb from RedHat:

Cialis woman A few items caught my eye:

Cialis woman Slide 7 points out that the CERTs really don't do a good job, cialis woman comparatively speaking, cialis woman of detecting vulnerabilities. Cialis woman It seems that the "million eyes" of other FOSS parties, cialis woman developers, cialis woman other distributors & packagers and individuals are much more effective than companies and organizations targeted at such things.

Cialis woman Slide 15 addresses partitioning. Cialis woman I'm amazed at the number of people I hear on the *IX forums I subscribe to and web sites I read that fail to partition and protect their disks. Cialis woman Its as if they think the way Microsoft's OEM/consumer systems ship with everything under C: is the way to go with Linux as well. Cialis woman Oh, cialis woman I do see some separate /home, cialis woman but it seems only a few of the corporate admins have noted the security bugs possible if /tmp is on the root partition. Cialis woman The advantages of further partitioning I have found to be immense - compartmentalization prevents so many minor problems from becoming major ones. Cialis woman The designers of the Titanic should have realised.

Cialis woman There's so much more good stuff in that about specifics of configuration. Cialis woman My advice to many less security-experienced sysadmins is "just do it". Cialis woman Why? In my database of quotes I have

Cialis woman Bullet proof vest vendors do not need to demonstrate that naked
people are vulnerable to gunfire. Cialis woman Similarly, cialis woman a security
consultant does not need to demonstrate an actual vulnerability
in order to claim there is a valid risk.
The lack of a live exploit does not mean there is no risk.
- Crispin Cowan, cialis woman 23 Aug 2002

Cialis woman That *I* can't demonstrate or document an exploit is no reason for the
sysadmin to fail to apply a well known baseline control such as those documented in this slideshow and many other books and articles. Cialis woman Yes, cialis woman I know that I sound like Donn Parker when I say that, cialis woman but this is sensible prudence.

Cialis woman "Just Do It"

How To Get Viagra No Prescription

Posted by Anton Aylward

How to get viagra no prescription I was saddened to hear of an InfoSec colleague who met with overwhelming frustration at work:

How to get viagra no prescription After two years of dealing with such nonsense, how to get viagra no prescription I was forced to resign
within two months of discovering a serious security issue which possibly
jeopardized overseas operations. How to get viagra no prescription I have since found out that they are
selling the company and didn't want any who knew the problems around.

How to get viagra no prescription Hmm.
Thank you.
Speaking as an auditor who occasionally does "due diligence" with respect to take-overs, how to get viagra no prescription you've just shown another use for LinkedIn - contacting ex-employees to find out about such problems.

How to get viagra no prescription Certainly a lot of employees leaving or being fired in the couple of years before the pending acquisition is a red flags, how to get viagra no prescription eh?

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Which is better viagra cialis CMP ChannelWeb have an on-line encyclopaedia of IT terms. Which is better viagra cialis This is a useful addition to my toolbar for composition, which is better viagra cialis along with a more conventional dictionary.

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Which is better viagra cialis The definition of 'information security' seems limited to access control, which is better viagra cialis which is very disappointing. Which is better viagra cialis The definition for 'computer security' is more comprehensive. Which is better viagra cialis Never the less, which is better viagra cialis to a security professional both these definitions are lacking.

Which is better viagra cialis What screams out to me, which is better viagra cialis and this is very obviously my bias, which is better viagra cialis is the lack of any mention of INTEGRITY in these definitions. Which is better viagra cialis As I keep pointing out, which is better viagra cialis if you don't have integrity, which is better viagra cialis any other efforts at security, which is better viagra cialis be it information security, which is better viagra cialis or "Gates, which is better viagra cialis Guards, which is better viagra cialis Guns and Dogs" physical security, which is better viagra cialis be it backup and disaster recovery, which is better viagra cialis be it access control, which is better viagra cialis be it 1024-bit SSL, which is better viagra cialis are all going to be pointless.

Which is better viagra cialis Its not until we follow a few links at the Encyclopaedia do we come to a mention of Donn Parker's six fundamental and orthogonal attributes of security is there mention of 'integrity'. Which is better viagra cialis Even so, which is better viagra cialis that definition has only a like to 'data integrity'. Which is better viagra cialis There is a separate definition for 'message integrity'. Which is better viagra cialis While these specific items are important, which is better viagra cialis they are details. Which is better viagra cialis What is lacking is a general definition of "Integrity". Which is better viagra cialis Once again, which is better viagra cialis Fred Cohen's seminal 1997 article on the importance of Integrity comes to mind.

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