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Nobody wants to pay for security, including security companies « The InfoSec Blog
The InfoSec Blog
2Jul/16

Nobody wants to pay for security, including security companies

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/nobody-wants-pay-security-including-companies-beno%C3%AEt-h-dicaire

In theory, consumers and businesses could punish Symantec for these
oversights by contracting with other security vendors. In practice, there’s
no guarantee that products from other vendors are well-secured,
either
— and there is no clearway to determine how secure a given security
product actually is.

Too many firms take an "appliance" or "product" (aka 'technology") approach to security. There's a saying that's been attributed to many security specialists over the years but is quite true:

If you think technology can solve your security problems,
then you don't understand the problems and you don't
understand the technology.

Its still true today.

The 'appliance' attitude is often accompanied by either an unwillingness to do a proper risk analysis and apply organizational changes to make the InfoSec structure self-reliant and where necessary self healing,
that is institute a proper ISMS - which is often quite a lot of initial effort and then ongoing effort, which bring to mind another old quotation:

The biggest problem a security consultant has is getting
managers to perform regular risk assessments. They don't
want to hear that it's an on going process. The attitude
was "why bother if I can't just check it once and be
done with it".

Not just the risk analysis but the risk management, and treat both as an ongoing cycle. As I say, a proper ISMS is needed - of which ISO27001/2 is a good example - rather than an 'appliance' or piece of OTS software such as those mentioned in the article, which often run on a 'fire and forget' mode and are installed by a netadmin or hostadmin who has little to no real, meaningful security understanding.

The buzz-line

Security is a process not a product

is quite true but understates the case. "Process" mean commitment from the Board and management, which in turn means there is budget to implement the possibly ongoing organizational changes to deal with
changes in the security profile to deal with the changes in technology and threats -- as indeed the recent shifts to BYOD and 'Cloud' have shown -- and the risk management processes, the people and the training.

Companies that are not willing to deal with this are going to suffer.
Breaches and hacks may have, up to now, been an embarrassment and inconvenience, perhaps the cost of sending out notification letters, a short blip in stock value. But consumer awareness is growing, and in
the e-commerce world consumers are coming to expect many basic quality and security baseline features. And that too is an evolving issue. sites like PayPal and eBay devote a lot of energy not simply to security but to the whole process of evolving security, being aware of evolving threats and methods and vulnerabilities.

But its also easy to do it all wrong, to go though the motions with no real results.

We can see that with the way the US Government is dealing with InfoSec and in doing so generating the artificial 'skills gap' of InfoSec specialists. What they are doing is demanding the low-level operatives, in effect 'enhanced' sysadmins and netadmins who are trained in using the appliances and configuring Windows devices and servers. This is 'tactical work. What they are avoiding doing is the strategic work, addressing organizational and structural issues, doing proper risk analysis and management, the heavy 'paperwork' of implementing ISO27000 or ISO31000. One reason for this is that it is going to be disruptive, "drag them kicking and screaming out of the 19th century".

We can point quite clearly to various US government departments since they are high profile, well publicized in the media and reports, and quite recidivist, but there are no shortage of other organizations, commercial, NGO and governmental, throughout the world that have implemented just enough "security to say "well that doesn't apply to me". All to often that 'just enough' is in the form of appliances and OTS software for otherwise poorly configured Windows systems, run by an under-staffed, under-trained (because its under-budgeted and managed by people who don't understand Risk Management) people. And there’s a lot of "Denial" going on.

This is why I like dealing with first and second tier banks and the large insurance companies that have been around for a long time. They've been doing Risk Analysis and management in the meat-world for a long time and segueing that into Cyberspace is no big deal for them. Their main issue is that they have to be a bit un-conservative to deal with rapidly advancing technology.

But as the real world shows, even they aren't completely immune.

So any organization saying "I'm all right" and "I don't need to do these things" and "I’m OK with my appliances and OTS software" is deluding themselves.

Se also  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect

Posted by Anton Aylward

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